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Abstract 
The European External Action Service (EEAS) is a hybrid and compound institutional actor in the EU’s 
multi-level administration with delegated authority from the member states (MS) to conduct the EU’s 
external action. Substantial competences, notably in the field of Neighbourhood and Trade policies, 
as well as Development and Cooperation remain under the control of the European Commission 
(Commission). At the same time, also Members of the European Parliament (EP) are more clearly 
voicing their interests and ownership in the EU’s representation in the world.  This article tests the 
notion of 'double-agent' – or in fact “triple-agent” – as a way of characterizing the position of the EEAS, 
and in particular of the EU Delegations (as the ‘EU field-level bureaucracies’) vis-à-vis the MS, the 
Commission and the EP, as an expression of complex and interrelated chains of delegation, where the 
EU ‘embassies‘ have to interact with and to answer to (but not in a clear line of delegation) different 
(sets of) principals, namely the MS, the Commission and the EP. Based on the findings from a series of 
elite interviews with 47 EEAS and Commission officials and on a survey among 184 EU diplomats, the 
paper seeks to examine this fuzzy principal-agent relationship and uses the review process of the EEAS 
as an opportunity to assess the level of autonomy of the new EU foreign policy apparatus. 
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The European External Action Service (EEAS) is frequently characterized as an “organizational hybrid” 
(Duke 2011: 46; Carta 2012: 167; Liszczyk and Formuszewicz 2013: 144) or as an “interstitial” 
organization (Bátora 2013), since it operates in multiple organizational fields. It ‘works rather like a 
chameleon’ (Blockmans and Hillion 2013: 9), fulfilling different institutional functions, in both the 
intergovernmental and community spheres. Legally, the EEAS is the recipient of delegated tasks from 
the member states (MS). Policy prerogatives in the field of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and 
Trade, Development and Cooperation (DEVCO) as well as Climate Action (CLIMA) and the budgetary 
competences for the EU’s external action remain under the control of the European Commission (and 
the respective DGs). In addition, also the European Parliament (EP) is more audibly voicing its interests 
and ownership in the EU’s representation in the world. In order to shed some light on this complex 
web of inter-relations, I develop and test a notion of 'double-agency' as a way of characterizing the 
situation of the EEAS and the EU Delegations (DELs1), in between the intergovernmental and the 
supranational spheres, as an expression of complex and interrelated chains of delegation, where the 
EEAS and in particular the EU embassies are compelled to interact with and to answer to, at least, two 
distinct - if not three - (sets of) principals (or “pseudo-principals”), namely “the” MS and COM, and 
increasingly also to the EP. 
The burgeoning literature on the EEAS has emphasized the specificities of EU foreign policy in the 
traditionally state-centred arena of international relations (Allen 2012; Dijkstra 2013; Raube 2012; 
M.E. Smith 2013; Thomas and Tonra 2012; Vanhoonacker et al. 2012), where the EEAS has been 
described as a long missing bridge over the divisions of the old EU pillar structure (see Balfour, Bailes 
and Kenna 2011; Hug et al. 2013; M.H. Smith 2012). Legal scholars (Blockmans and Hillion 2013; 
Cardwell 2012; Van Vooren 2010) have discussed the place and role of the EEAS in the EU’s 
institutional architecture and its formal legal status and competences. In addition, some work has 
been done on organizational questions (Bátora 2013; Henökl 2014; Ongaro 2012; Wisniewski 2012) as 
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well as on recruitment and integration of national diplomats (Duke and Lange 2013; Juncos and 
Pomorska 2013a, 2013b; Murdoch et al. 2014; Novotná 2014; Spence 2012). What is missing so far is 
research on EEAS-officials’ actual decision-making behaviour based on solid quantitative data. 
Drawing on a recent survey carried out among EEAS officials, which investigates the degree of de facto 
autonomy of the organization, this paper adds a public administration perspective and sets out to 
disentangle the command and control structures governing the EU foreign policy apparatus. 
The problem of agency autonomy in international organizations has already been researched (see 
Hawkins et al. 2006; Vaubel 2006); and principal-agent (P-A) relations in EU foreign economic policy 
have been dealt with by several scholars (see Delreux and Kerremans 2010; Dür and Elsing 2011; 
Wessel and den Hertog 2012). The relevance of the principal-agent approach for the EEAS, and, more 
specifically, an analysis the rationale behind the delegation of power has recently been confirmed by 
Hrant Kostanyan (2014). The control mechanisms deployed by the EEAS’ many principals have been 
explored by Jost-Henrik Morgenstern (2013a), but also other fields have contributed to this debate; 
from a development policy angle, for instance, Mark Furness (2013) made a very insightful attempt to 
provide an answer to the question of ‘who controls the EEAS?’. The puzzle is whether and how the 
EEAS will carve out an autonomous role, defined as relative independence in its actions (Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004; Egeberg and Trondal 2009; Ellinas and Suleiman 2012), from its principals, the MS, 
on the one hand, but also with regard to the inter-institutional relations with the Commission and the 
EP, on the other. This question has at least two dimensions: the first dimension concerns the EEAS’ 
bureaucratic integration with the central level EU institutions, notably the European Commission (EC). 
The issue here is whether the EEAS will be successful in extending its powers vis-à-vis other EU 
institutions, and increase its capacities in terms of resources (budget, staff, competences etc.) 
accordingly. The second aspect concerns the administrative decision-making in different policy areas 
in which the EEAS will be more or less successful to establish some degree of independence vis-à-vis 
the EU MS.  
The High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy and Vice-President of the 
Commission (HR/VP), by definition, has competences which fall under the community method as well 
as intergovernmental decision-making. The EEAS has thus several political masters and works in areas 
with different decision-making rules and procedures. Furness (2013: 109) claims that ‘mixed 
competence policy areas raise further possibilities”, because of the “grey area between them’, and 
that it ‘is therefore likely that the EEAS will have opportunities to push for greater autonomy in some 
policy areas and its options will be limited in others.’ The place or the organizational locus, where both 
the intergovernmental and the community competence areas are present and intersect, with the idea 
of joining forces, in order to increase the “coherence” of the EU’s external action, are the EU DELs in 
third countries, where personnel form different EU institutions is working closely together, sharing 
intense contacts and exchanging information on a daily basis (Pfeffer 1982: 266; see also Hatch and 
Cunliffe 2006; Therborn 2006). Organizational geography, the physical location of officials, has been 
demonstrated to matter for socialization and institutionalization of behaviour, as the ‘forming mould 
for actors’ (Therborn 2006: 512; Jacobsen 1989, Egeberg 1994, 2012; Egeberg and Trondal 2011; 
Henökl and Trondal 2013). Physical presence and proximity relationships have been highly valued in 
the conduct of diplomacy since the establishment of the first resident embassies in fifteenth century 
Italy (Bull 1977: 160; Bátora 2008). Especially in contexts of high volatility and uncertainty, as in foreign 
and security policy, agents have a preference for negotiation and information exchange in face-to-
face settings. In diplomacy, even more than in other organizational and governance contexts, 
information, especially accurate and professionally processed, and often confidential information, is 
a crucial resource (Berridge 2002: 122; Blom and Vanhoonacker 2015, Dijkstra and Vanhoonacker 
2011, Maurer 2014). This predilection for personal contact was also corroborated by the survey data, 
where more than 80 per cent of respondents expressed their preference for direct, face-to-face 
meetings, whether formal or informal, as compared to other means of exchange, such as telephone 
or video-conferencing. Informal face-to-face meetings are particularly strongly favoured by diplomats 
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in EU Delegations, where 91 per cent consider them as ‘important’ or ‘very important’, as compared 
to 82 per cent of HQ officials.  
Adopting a principal-agent perspective, this article sheds some light at the intertwined chains of 
delegation that run from the political masters in Brussels and the MS capitals through diverse channels 
of instruction and reporting all the way “down” to the “field-level bureaucrats”, i.e. diplomats and 
officials working at the 139 EU Delegations around the world. The research is based on empirical data 
from 47 semi-structured interviews as well as from a recent survey among 184 decision-makers in the 
EEAS and Commission officials posted at EU Delegations. Questions, addressed by the survey, are: 
Who are the people running the EU foreign policy machinery? Who are these agents in contact with? 
Whom do they listen to? What are the concerns and considerations officials take into account in the 
decision-making process? And where do the political signals, agents receive and emphasize actually 
come from? How does the role of the EU Delegations influence the autonomy of the EEAS vis-à-vis the 
MS? The survey features an almost equal distribution between officials at HQ and posted at EU 
Delegations in third countries, which makes it possible to compare the two groups as regards their 
contact patterns, concerns and considerations, as well as emphasis put on political signals from 
different institutional sources. Key findings from the survey reveal a number of interesting differences 
between officials at HQ and those “at arm’s length”, at Delegations. Staff at Delegations has 
considerably more contacts outside the organization and emphasizes more strongly signals from 
central-level EU institutions as compared to signals from member states.  
 
A PRINCIPAL-AGENT PERSPECTIVE 
P-A theory builds on rational cost-benefit calculation as the main logic of action, whereby actors 
engage in wilful institutional design and delegate certain competences, in order to avoid conflict, 
reduce uncertainty or reap economies of scale (Majone 2001; Tallberg 2002; Shepsle 2006). A vast 
body of literature on P-A relations has been accumulating since the 1990s when scholars started to 
apply principal-agent modelling to the European Union to understand the relationship between the 
member states and the EU institutions (Pollack 1997, 2003; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002), and to 
describe the EU and its functioning (Dehousse 2008; Franchino 2007; Kassim and Menon 2003; Scharpf 
1997 and 2000; Pierson 1996). A number of authors have framed EU external relations and trade 
policies in a P-A perspective and as a problem of incomplete contracting (see Delreux and Kerremans 
2010; Dür and Elsig 2011; Wessel and den Hertog 2012). According to the P-A logic, the EU member 
states as “collective principal” choose to establish agents to reduce transaction costs by relieving 
themselves of certain tasks, by acquiring expertise, or by limiting the complexity of decision-making. 
Agents can exploit conflicting preferences among their principals or informational asymmetries to 
their advantage to increase their autonomy. To prevent bureaucratic drift or agency slippage and to 
make agents accountable, principals aim at creating oversight and control arrangements (Hawkins et 
al. 2006: 12-20; Koremenos et al. 2001). Autonomy may be enhanced by dysfunctional control 
mechanisms or if communication among the principals is hampered by bureaucratic politics. But the 
autonomy of bureaucratic agents not only depends on the structure of political oversight and control, 
it also has to do with the agent’s own characteristics (Hawkins and Jacoby 2006). Organizational 
characteristics such as the EEAS’ boundary position, its geographic spread, fluid organizational 
membership and behavioural predispositions of officials may be of crucial importance in this context 
and conducive to the development of increased agency autonomy (Cohen et al. 1972; Aldrich and 
Herker 1977; Stinchcombe 1965). 
Applying the P-A model to the EEAS, however, produces the dilemma of simultaneous presence of 
multiple principals (the member states individually) and a collective principal (Council), as well as a 
number of oversight and control functions assumed by the European Parliament and the Commission, 
resulting in complex and intertwined lines of delegation. In search for a more sophisticated model, 
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accounting for this situation of multiple principals, the chapter proposes the image of a “double-
agent” to depict the relationship between the EEAS and the member states, on the one hand, and the 
supra-national EU institutions on the other. Given the more complex and multi-dimensional nature of 
composite political systems unfolding at the EU level, Renaud Dehousse (2008) has suggested 
(originally for regulatory agencies) a “multi-principals model,” arguing that ‘despite its unquestionable 
relevance, the principal-agent model, in its standard form, is analytically inadequate as it does not 
take into consideration some of the peculiarities of the EU setting. The most important of these is the 
absence of a clearly defined “principal” since European institutional architecture has been carefully 
designed to avoid any concentration of power’ (Dehousse 2008: 790).  
In the case of the EEAS, and more particularly the EU DELs, the most important delegated tasks are 
representation of EU interests, maintaining a channel for negotiations and dialogue, as well as for 
information gathering (Art. 221(1) TFEU, EEAS Decision, Art. 5; see also: Blockmanns et al. 2013: 12, 
32-34). In addition, depending on the EUs relations with particular countries, the EU DELs are the 
liaison offices for DG DEVCO responsible for the management of cooperation and development 
programmes, as well as footholds in third countries for DGs Trade, Enlargement, and ENP. With the 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty (LT) and the creation of the EEAS, the nature of tasks changed 
from a trade and cooperation focus to more strongly emphasizing foreign policy, characterized by 
political and security concerns (Maurer and Raik 2014). New responsibilities of the EU DELs include 
assuming the role of the permanent EU presidency, chairing the meetings of Heads of Missions and 
other working groups of member state diplomats, political reporting, as well as delivering EU 
démarches.  
 
MULTIPLE PRINCIPALS AND “DOUBLE AGENCY” 
Given the multi-level and polycentric structure of the composite political system unfolding at the EU 
level, the P-A approach has been modified and fine-tuned (see Curtin 2007: 528). Dehousse (2008) has 
suggested (originally for regulatory agencies) a “multi-principals model,” arguing that ‘the principal-
agent model, in its standard form, is analytically inadequate as it does not take into consideration 
some of the peculiarities,’ in particular ‘the absence of a clearly defined “principal,” since the 
European institutional architecture has been carefully designed to avoid any concentration of power.’ 
Moreover, the different principals in the EU system fear to relinquish power, and their main concern 
is less “agency-drift” than “political drift”, ‘in which agencies are somehow captured by one of their 
institutional rivals in the leadership contest’ (Dehousse 2008: 796). This leadership contest has been 
manifest in the area of external policy, since the early days of the European Political Cooperation in 
the 1970s (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 165-167). Later, during the European Convention preceding, 
the Intergovernmental Conference, which ultimately led to the Lisbon Treaty, the MS have been 
divided and were finally opposed to grant additional foreign policy competences to the European 
Commission (Morgenstern 2013b). In contrast to external relations, the CFSP continues to be driven 
and controlled by the MS and an intergovernmental mode of decision-making, notably by retaining 
unanimity also post-Lisbon. Delegation of authority and control of the EEAS involves the Council of 
Ministers, the national foreign services, the EP (with regard to staff and administrative budget, and 
newly acquired competences) as well as the European Commission (for traditional external EU 
policies). Information asymmetries may arise from different contact patterns between HQ and EU 
DELs, as well as from a lack of clarity with regard to roles and instructions. Potential for drift or slippage 
may be expected from diverging interests and receptivity to other political signals and inputs. Cultural 
dynamics can be expected to differ alongside with underlying patterns of conflicts and cleavages. 
In parallel, the conceptualization of the multi-level actor/forum relationships in the EU system (see 
Bovens et al. 2013; Wille 2013; Brandsma 2013), led to elaborate on the increasingly sophisticated 
European “accountability architecture” and on an “accountability framework for multi-level 
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governance,” where one actor may be in a variety of accountability relationships, and simultaneously 
answerable to different forums. However, having essentially an “ex-post” character of checking the 
compliance with rules, the control mechanisms of this architecture and framework are applicable 
mainly to formal decision-making and the legislative process, and cannot fully account for all stages of 
the process, in particular with regard to the informal aspects of administrative behaviour, allowing for 
some discretion of bureaucrats in the policy shaping and implementation, based on values, beliefs, 
identities, role expectations and perceptions, opinions, organisational culture or “bounded 
rationality” (Simon 1972). Certain parts of the policy formulation, steering and implementation 
process may simply “stay under the radar” of the mentioned mechanisms, and it cannot be excluded 
that these are of significance. Chances are that how and with what kind of mind-set minutes of 
meetings are written, for instance, or the cognitive capacities, predetermined opinions or a potential 
hidden agenda of an agent sitting on – or chairing – an evaluation or steering committee or drafting a 
report, analysis, non-paper or, say, a policy proposal may escape the scrutiny of even the most 
thorough monitoring instruments. By taking a bottom-up perspective the notion of “double-agent” 
corresponds to and reflects the existence of multiple principals or multiple forums, creating overlaps, 
situations of ambiguity and potential problems of “multiple accountability disorder” (Schillemans and 
Bovens 2011: 6).  
In a P-A perspective, agency of the EEAS is “nested,” that is there are intricate and variable P-A 
relationships, where recipients of supra-nationally delegated powers might, in a different 
constellation, be the principal for another agent (which could at times act as the operational principal 
for the first), resulting in blurred lines of delegation between Council, EP, the Commission and the 
EEAS. Thus, there may be room for larger bureaucratic drift and agency loss, especially in a context of 
asymmetric and incomplete information as well as dual and parallel channels of communication 
between principals and agents. I adopt the definition of agency loss, suggested by Arthur Lupia (2003: 
35); ‘Agency loss is the difference between the actual consequence of delegation and what the 
consequence would have been had the agent been “perfect”’; ‘“perfect” being a hypothetical agent 
who does what the principal would have done if the principal had unlimited information and resources 
to do the job herself.’ In the case of EU DELs this is particularly intricate, especially in instances where 
the preferences of the different principals diverge. Such situations may provide the DELs with 
increased leeway and opportunities for autonomous action, which in turn would feed back into the 
inter-institutional relationship, and ultimately lead to a higher degree of independence of the EEAS 
vis-à-vis the political masters in Brussels as well as in the MS capitals. Furness (2013: 117) estimates 
that ‘the EEAS may be able to build its agency through its [D]elegations to third countries and 
international organizations […and] can be expected to use this “upgrade” [of EC Delegations to Union 
Delegations] to increase its political influence within the EU system.’ Chains of delegation are blurred 
and intertwined, not least because the Commission is itself a body vested with powers resulting from 
supra-national delegation by the EU MS. Competences are partly overlapping, instructions are issued 
by several sources and reporting lines have in many instances been characterized as redundant. The 
EEAS Review document tabled by HR/VP in July 2013, for instance, speaks of two separate and parallel 
structures for the coordination of human resources in EU Delegations (“EUDEL” and “COMDEL” 
working groups), and concludes that ‘this dual system leads to multiple debate on the same issues, 
delays in decision-making and can be an obstacle to direct contacts between the EEAS and Commission 
service with a stake in Delegations’ (EEAS 2013: 11). 
 
METHODOLOGY 
In April 2013 an online questionnaire was distributed to 617 EU officials. The recipients were randomly 
selected, on the basis of available EEAS staff lists and e-mail addresses on EU DELs’ websites. Within 
the possibilities of selection, some attention was paid to a balanced distribution of invitations to 
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complete the survey according to organizational affiliation, place of assignment, function and 
hierarchical level. After three reminder e-mail messages and administering 70 paper questionnaires 
at the EEAS headquarters in Brussels, the survey could harvest a total of 184 responses, comprising 
148 completed questionnaires and 36 partially completed ones.2 For the sample of ca. 680 eligible 
respondents this results in a response rate of approximately 30 per cent. As can be demonstrated, the 
data is valid and representative both with regard to officials’ previous affiliation, geographical balance 
(country of origin), place of assignment, educational background as well as age and gender. Most of 
the officials in this survey (74 persons, 41 per cent) were recruited (transferred) from DG RELEX, 19 
respondents  (11 per cent) from the Council Secretariat General (SGC), and 24 respondents (13 per 
cent) from MS Ministries of Foreign Affairs. The 24 seconded national diplomats in the survey come 
from 18 different member states. About 21 per cent of the respondents were working for other 
Commission DGs before 2011, i.e. Aid and Cooperation (AIDCO), Development (DEV), TRADE, and 
Enlargement (ELARG). 
 
Table1: Institutional affiliation and provenance 
 Previous affiliation (%) Present affiliation (%) 
EEAS - 75 
Council SG 10.6 - 
COM DG RELEX 41.1 - 
COM DEVCO - 12.5 
COM DG AIDCO 8.3 - 
COM DG ELARG 0.6 2.2 
COM DG TRADE 1.1 1.6 
COM DG DEV 12.2 - 
MS MFA 13.3 2.2 
EP 1.1 1.1 
Other 11.7 5.4 
N 180 184 
Institutional affiliation and provenance (mean N=182) 
Abbreviations: EEAS: European External Action Service, SG: Secretariat General, COM: European Commission, DG: 
Directorate General, RELEX: External Relations, DEVCO: Development and Cooperation, AIDCO: Aid and Cooperation (until 
2010), ELARG: Enlargement, DEV: Development (until 2010), MS: Member State, MFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EP: 
European Parliament. 
 
The 21 officials having indicated “other” as their previous affiliation mention either various 
Commission DGs, not listed in the questionnaire, other national authorities or agencies (e.g. 
defence/civil protection, development or police), as well as international organizations (IOs) or 
research institutions as their affiliation of origin. Four respondents do not disclose their institution of 
origin. It may be interesting to trace movements and career trajectories of officials and to see whether 
where they come from has a bearing on their attitudes, role perceptions and preferences, whether 
there are differences pertaining to their individual experiences of the changes, or which concerns and 
signals they choose to emphasize.  
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Overall the survey features an almost equal distribution between HQ-staff (52 per cent) and officials 
posted in DELs (47 per cent). Three respondents did not specify their place of assignment. Within the 
two populations (HQ and DELs) the distribution is also fairly balanced with regard to staff category, 
level of tasks and gender. The data is less balanced regarding previous affiliation, where there is  a 
slight selection bias in favour of previous Commission staff, which to some extent however reflects 
also the overall picture of EEAS staff (approximately 1/3 of staff coming from MS MFAs), as 
demonstrated in the table below. 
 
Table 2: Distribution by HQ and Delegations 
  HEADQUARTER 
% (frequency) 
DELEGATIONS 
% (frequency) 
N 
Total 
Affiliation Previously Commission 65.8 (52) 79.5 (73) 
167 
Previously Council and / or MFA 34.2 (27) 20.5 (15) 
Staff category AD 61.8 (55) 66.7 (50) 
164 
AST 18.0 (16) 13.3 (10) 
SND 10.1 (9) 14.7 (11) 
SNE 3.4 (3) 4.0 (3) 
CA 6.7 (6) 1.3 (1) 
Task level Political / diplomatic 55.5 (50) 55.7 (44) 
169 Administrative / managerial 42.2 (38) 40.5 (32) 
Operational / technical 2.2 (2) 3.8 (3) 
Sex Female 30.5 (25) 31.7 (20) 
143 
Male 68.3 (56) 66.7 (42) 
 Average N 85.0 (52) 76.0 (47) 161 
Distribution according to affiliation, staff category, task level, and sex in HQ and DELs (average N=161) 
Abbreviations: AD: Administrator, AST: Assistant, SND: Seconded National Diplomat, SNE: Seconded National Expert, CA: 
Contractual Agent. 
 
Representation by Member State 
Considering for the moment only the data from the online questionnaire launched in April 2013, the 
survey gathered officials from 23 EU MS, with countries most strongly represented being: Germany 
(22 responses), Belgium (14), Italy (13), France (12), the Netherlands (10) and the UK (9 officials).  53 
respondents did not disclose their country of origin. Among the respondents, German nationals are 
somewhat overrepresented in relation to the total number of German EEAS officials (126 officials: 84 
AD and 42 AST), as are the Netherlands (10 respondents compared to 55 Dutch EEAS officials in total, 
20 AD and 25 AST). Belgium, although a small MS, is strongly represented in the survey sample as well 
as in the EEAS population (226: 60 AD and 166 AST), whereas Spain and Poland (5 and 4 respondents 
respectively) score somewhat below their weight in terms of organizational population (Spain: 122 
EEAS officials, Poland: 61). France, Italy, and the UK are reasonably well represented within the study 
compared to the share of their countrymen and women within the EEAS, and the same is true for a 
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Table 3: Respondents by Member State 
MS 
Survey 
respondents 
Interview 
partners 
Total 
EEAS population 
(March 2013) 
(By category) (All) (AD and SND)  (AD) (AST) 
BE 14 1 15 60 166 
BG - - - 12 4 
CZ 3 1 4 23 11 
DK 2 - 2 23 16 
DE 22 9 31 84 42 
EE 1 2 3 12 8 
IE 2 - 2 22 14 
EL 1 - 1 33 26 
ES 5 3 6 81 41 
FR 12 5 17 12 56 
IT 13 3 16 98 49 
CY - - - 4 1 
LV 2 - 2 10 3 
LT - 1 1 10 5 
LU - - - 3 - 
HU 4 2 6 21 10 
MT 1 - 1 8 4 
NL 10 1 11 30 25 
AT 8 8 16 28 11 
PL 4 - 4 38 23 
PT 1 - 1 27 28 
RO 2 1 3 13 16 
SI 2 - 2 6 9 
SK 1 1 2 8 4 
FI 5 1 6 22 18 
SE 7 3 10 35 28 
UK 9 4 13 68 31 
Not specified 53 1 (NO) 54 - - 
TOTAL (N) 184 47 231 899 649 
Number of respondents and interview partners by MS as compared to EEAS population, Survey N= 184 
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number of medium-sized and smaller member states (see Table 3, also listing the number of interview 
partners by MS as compared to the total EEAS population). 
The questionnaire was designed as a blend of standardized and open questions, gathering some basic 
biographical information on affiliation and function (Q1-3); moving to questions on previous and 
present work situations (Q4-6); the interviewee’s opinions on the organization of new service, its ways 
of working and its organizational culture (Q7-11); collecting data on contact patterns, allegiance, 
concerns and considerations, as well as political signals and sources of political input (Q11-17); and 
ending on some demographic questions. 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE EMPIRICAL DATA 
Contact patterns of EEAS officials 
While at HQ in Brussels information flow and coordination are hampered by rigid structures, 
inflexibility and bureaucratic rivalry (ECA 2014: 12; EEAS 2014: 32; Juncos and Pomorska 2013a), one 
would expect agents at DELs to be driven by the functional need for close cross-institutional 
cooperation and information sharing, and over time by a tendency to intra- and inter-organizational 
integration (Trondal and Peters 2013). The EEAS Review underlines this point, stating ‘while respecting 
individual roles and responsibilities’ in the working arrangements between the EEAS and the 
Commission ‘there is a degree of flexibility for Commission staff in Delegations to contribute to the 
political work of the EEAS’ (EEAS 2013: 11). The modalities of working relations between Commission 
and EEAS staff at DELs have been addressed by the “Joint Decision on Cooperation Mechanisms’ 
between the services” (European Commission/HR/VP 2012). When asked whether since January 2011, 
after the establishment of the EEAS and taking up their new function, they had more or less contacts 
within their own organization, roughly 46 per cent of HQ staff said they had significantly more 
contacts, compared to 31 per cent at DELs (overall HQ and DELs: 39 per cent). Outside contacts have 
evolved slightly differently: 41 per cent of HQ staff say they have more contacts outside, and 47 per 
cent of Delegation personnel indicate increased levels of outside contacts (44 per cent overall). About 
40 per cent (HQ) vs. 47 per cent (DELs) say, it remained the same, and nearly one fifth (19 per cent) at 
HQ maintain (significantly) less outside contacts, whereas only 6 per cent at DELs report a decreased 
number of outside contacts. In more detail, these inside and outside contacts, broken down by 
populations at HQ and EU Delegations, look as follows in Table 4. 
The pattern of the survey data suggests that whereas officials at EU DELs have slightly less contacts 
within their own organization than their colleagues at HQ, and increasingly so moving up the 
hierarchy, they have a significantly higher level of outside contacts, especially as regards contacts with 
IOs, their own domestic ministries and agencies, with ministries and agencies of other EU MS as well 
as those of third countries, but also with NGOs, business and industry, and other, such as media, 
associations and the civil society at large. This data seems to confirm our expectations that in DELs, 
more remote from and out of the immediate range of their policy-making hierarchy in Brussels, 
contacts across organizations and with “the outside” become more frequent or more intense, and 
therefore more important. These results also support the argument of informational asymmetries, in 
that HQ officials, who are mainly concerned with strategic aspects of policy-making (including planning 
and programming), are more remote from the day-to-day implementation business in third countries. 
Due to the nature of their tasks and the direct exposure to the “field” (notably also because of the EU 
DELs’ involvement in aid and cooperation), personnel at EU DELs have closer contacts and better 
access to operational-level information. On the development side, this has recently been observed by 
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Table 4: Contacts in- and outside the organisation 
 HEADQUARTER (N=82) DELEGATIONS (N=75) 
 
(Very) 
frequently 
(%) 
Occasionally 
(%) 
Rarely/ 
almost 
never (%) 
(Very) 
frequently 
(%) 
Occasionally 
(%) 
Rarely/ 
almost 
never (%) 
Colleagues within 
unit/division 
95.3 4.7 0.0 94.2 4.3 1.4 
Head of unit/division 84.3 13.3 2.4 75.3 15.4 9.2 
Director 50.6 32.1 17.3* 33.3 26.1 40.5* 
Other departments 67.1 25.9 7.1 58.0 23.2 18.8 
Other institutions 53.0 34.1 13.0 30.5 26.1 33.3 
Commissioner/politic
al head of entity 
8.6 8.5 82.9 13.0 5.8 81.1 
International 
organisations 
18.1 39.8 42.1 58.0 27.5 14.4 
Domestic ministries 
and agencies 
12.3 37.0 50.6 40.7 28.4 20.9 
Ministries/agencies of 
other EU Member 
States 
26.5 30.1 43.4 49.3 24.6 26.1 
Ministries/agencies of 
third countries 
20.7 26.8 52.5 66.6 14.5 18.8 
Non-governmental 
organisations 
23.2 24.4 52.4 57.9 26.1 15.9 
Business industry 6.1 22.0 71.9 20.3 31.9 47.8 
Universities/ 
research institutes 
12.2 36.6 51.2 17.4 42.0 40.5 
Other (media, civil 
society etc.) 
15.5 31.0 53.6 43.8 33.3 22.9 
*6% almost never, **25% almost never 
Contact patterns (Total N=157). Original codes as used in the survey: 1 = “Very frequently”, 2 = “Frequently”, 3 = 
“Occasionally”, 4 = “Rarely”, 5 = “(Almost) never”, 0 = “Can’t say” 
 
Maurizio Carbone (2013: 349), claiming that, ‘aid practitioners at headquarter level [assume] in a 
rather paternalistic way that greater EU actorness would be welcomed by aid recipients.’ Frequently, 
it is argued, HQ seems to be lacking crucial information about what is going on in the field. Given the 
decreasing intra-organizational contacts when moving up the hierarchy, such tendencies are 
particularly important for decision-makers at the political level (of both the EU and MS sides), and may 
produce situations of the “tail wagging the dog”, since ‘information asymmetries turn bureaucrats into 
knowledgeable experts and their political overseers into the dilettantes Weber describes’ (Ellinas and 
Suleiman 2012: 63). In addition, there is also a need and a tendency for a more flexible and versatile 
role understanding in EU Delegations, which is also reflected in the behaviour of EU diplomats in third 
countries (cf. Henökl and Webersik 2014), as confirmed by an official posted at an EU DEL:  
I don’t see how else you can go about these things: we, willingly, are European civil servants; 
at least that is what I am.  So our goal is to also serve the wider purposes of the Union, and if 
it means a bit more about foreign policy, intervening into files that have a broader reach, then 
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this is what we are hired for. We are supposed to be versatile in our backgrounds, and to sort 
things out (Interview #403). 
In the same vein, another official emphasizes the team character of staff at EU DELs:  
[M]any of the issues [at HQ], for instance corporate identity and so forth are issues that I am 
not busy with, because we have an EU Delegation. We deal with the colleagues in the 
Delegation in the country. We have a corporate identity as a team. For example, we have a 
human rights working group, and I am chairing this group. […] But I also invite the guy who is 
doing human rights projects, spending money on it. You know, it is not the EEAS – it is the EU 
Delegation really [emphasis on the word “Delegation”] (Interview #184). 
The same applies for direct contact and mutual exposure between different staff categories. Interview 
partners working at EU Delegations in third countries have testified in favour of this hypothesis: 
In our delegation the HoD [Head of Delegation] comes from the Commission he knows all 
these people, he worked in ECHO and knows everyone. So he feels like he is double-hatted, 
he is treated like he is double-hatted. He says he is double-hatted. Those who come from the 
MS see that [it is] more difficult for them to get into that and to accept that (Interview #165). 
Even though altogether the integration of national diplomats reportedly works rather well, some 
problems having to do with a lack of socialization persist, as put by a former EU HoD: 
We have been integrating these national diplomats too quickly, and I think it has been 
regretted from different sides, because they have not been properly trained. There is a bit of 
difference between an Ambassador and a Head of Delegation. And they are going out without 
a network in Brussels [...]. If you drop somebody from a national MFA, first of all, he has 
problem with understanding his role. In many countries he has to manage a cooperation 
programme, which he has never done in his life-time. And he has to cope with this complex 
administration here in Brussels, where people are fighting with each other, and if you don’t 
know how to zigzag through it, you are stuck” (Interview #4, former EC/EU HoD6). 
Connected to this close relationship and with regard to the type of contact and communication 
considered important by officials, differences between HQ and DELs are not significant, maybe with 
the exception of “spontaneous encounters”, as a particular form of face-to-face contact. These are 
valued more strongly at DELs, 40 per cent, as compared to 33 per cent at HQ, a tendency that can be 
explained by physical closeness within smaller office premises, regular direct exchange with colleagues 
(who are often part of the same “expat bubble”) and the day-to-day exposure to common issues and 
problems. 
 
Multiple principals, double-agency, and “nested delegation” 
Diverging or even contradictive signals and instructions from different sources may also produce a 
lack of clarity or cause confusion on the side of the agent, necessitating requests for clarification and 
delaying or limiting his/her capacity to act on behalf of the principals. This seems to be the case in EU 
DELs, where multiple and parallel channels of instructions and reporting lines are not sufficiently 
coordinated, and individual agents may receive different signals (Duke 2014: 33; ECA 2014: 21-22, 
para. 58-60). Wouters et al. (2013: 39) commented that “[t]he evident confusion in lines of 
responsibility and communication at the senior echelons of the Service had been noted beforehand, 
with one report noting the presence of ‘several duplicating layers of management, unclear hierarchy 
in terms of chain of command and opaque relationships between different departments’”. And, 
according to Duke (2014: 33), “[c]onfusion about the precise responsibilities of the most senior levels 
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was evident in the original Council decision [2010/427/EU] on issues such as budgetary management”. 
This organisational conundrum also finds expression in the survey results: Officials were asked 
whether, compared to their experiences before the launch of the EEAS, their role had changed with 
regard to a number of aspects related to their job-profiles and functions. This organizational 
conundrum also finds expression in the survey results: officials were asked whether, compared to their 
experiences before the launch of the EEAS, their role had changed with regard to a number of aspects 
related to their job-profiles and functions. Respondents overall indicate that changes occurring after 
the launch of the EEAS were important, especially concerning “political exposure” and “political 
interferences” (more than half of the respondents said “more or significantly more”), but also as 
regards “clarity of one’s own role and function”, as well as “clarity of reporting lines” and “clarity of 
organizational goals and strategy” (nearly half said “(significantly) less”). In one word, the 
establishment of the EEAS has introduced – at least during the early stages of the new organization – 
an element of opacity and ambiguity for officials regarding the clarity of their roles and instructions, 
lines of reporting and especially as regards organisational goals and strategy, where overall more than 
half of the surveyed staff perceive a rather sharp decline. 
 
Table 5: Perceived changes in the work situation 
 HEADQUARTER (Mean N=83) DELEGATIONS (Mean N=77) 
 
(Significantly) 
more (%) 
Same  
(%) 
(Significantly) 
less (%) 
(Significantly) 
more (%) 
Same  
(%) 
(Significantly) 
less (%) 
Political 
exposure 
46.8 32.9 18.3 64.1 29.7 6.3 
Political 
interference 
57.2 35.1 7.8 51.6 43.5 4.8 
Clarity of 
role/function 
15.4 36.9 47.6 18.8 39.1 42.0 
Clarity of 
instructions 
14.2 36.9 48.8 17.4 33.3 49.3 
Clarity of lines 
of reporting 
9.6 42.2 48.2 18.8 33.3 47.8 
Clarity of org. 
goals and 
strategy 
14.8 24.7 60.5 14.4 36.2 49.3 
Administrative 
burden 
63.1 26.2 10.7 72.4 20.3 7.2 
Perceived changes in work situation (Total N=160) 
Original codes as used in the survey: 1 = “Significantly more”, 2 = “More”, 3 = “Same”, 4 = “Less”, 5 = “Significantly less”, 0 
= “Can’t say” 
 
Key differences between HQ and DELs concern political exposure, where 64 per cent of the staff at 
DELs perceive “significantly more” political exposure as compared to 47 per cent at HQ, but also the 
administrative burden has increased more significantly at DELs. This partly has to do with the higher 
profile of the EU DELs, and their new role as exercising the permanent EU Presidency (see also 
interviews, e.g. #18, 24, 31, 447), but probably also with the aforementioned redundant and parallel 
reporting lines as well as multiple sources of instructions. Interviewees further report a multiplication 
in the generation of reports, notes and briefings (in different versions depending on the addressee, 
whether, for instance, EEAS HQ or MS MFAs), as well as a proliferation of requests for assistance from 
various institutional actors besides the HR/VP, namely Council and Commission Presidents, line 
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Commissioners, MS governments and the EP. Despite decreasing clarity regarding role and 
instructions, it seems that the “clarity of organizational goals and strategy” has suffered less in DELs 
than at HQ: 49 per cent at DELs vs. 61 per cent at HQ asserting “(significantly) less”. One possible 
explanation is that the core task of representing the EU is more tangible and more directly experienced 
in Delegations than at HQ. 
In the short term, the EEAS Review proposes to remedy the problem of functional overlaps and 
organizational ambiguity by recommendation nr. 14:  ‘Requir[ing] all instructions to [D]elegations to 
pass by Heads of Delegations, copied to the relevant EEAS geographical desk’ (EEAS 2013: 16). The 
issue, however, originates in the distribution of lead-responsibilities between the HR/VP and the 
Commission. As pointed out in the Review, ‘the division of responsibilities is potentially unclear and 
should be clarified. The allocation of portfolio responsibilities in the next Commission presents an 
opportunity for the President of the Commission to review the situation’ (EEAS 2013: 8). One official 
at a key Delegation summarizes the dilemma as follows: 
I have a number of bosses now, they have multiplied with the [institutional] change, and with 
going from Brussels to a Delegation: there you have an Ambassador and a number two of the 
Delegation, whom I work for as well. When there is good communication between my 
ambassador, for instance, and my DG in Brussels, it’s not that I can play one against the other, 
there is no room for that (Interview #408). 
This evaluation of having different political interlocutors, different reporting lines and hierarchies in 
Brussels and also ‘significant others’ in the MS capitals), emitting messages, signals and instructions is 
also corroborated by the survey results. Replying to the question, “In average, how much do you 
emphasize the (political) signals coming from the following?”, officials indicated they pay most 
attention to their “direct hierarchy” (84 per cent - “(very) important”) and the “political 
leadership/senior management of their entity” (92 per cent). Yet, presented with a choice of different 
political actors outside their own organization, EEAS officials pay most attention to central level EU 
institutions: the European Commission, 81 per cent; Foreign Affairs Council, 79 per cent; and European 
Council, 78 per cent, with the first scoring 10 per cent higher at “very important” (40 per cent vs. 30 
per cent); and finally the EP, at 65 per cent. They also indicated, “the big EU member states”, 58 per 
cent, “the medium-sized EU member states”, 34 per cent, IOs, 26 per cent, “the small MS”, 25 per 
cent, and, finally, “signals from the domestic government of my own member state”, 19 per cent (see 
Table 6).  
The emphasis on concerns and considerations as well as the importance given to political signals 
seems to be fairly balanced at headquarters and DELs, with some notable exceptions. First, as regards 
the importance of European Institutions: both the European Commission and the EP are ranked (15 
per cent and 10 per cent respectively) higher at Delegations than at HQ. In contrast, the influence of 
MS (in order of their relative weight from “big” to “medium-sized” to smaller MS) is more strongly felt 
in Brussels than at Delegations. The complexity of the institutional arrangements is also reflected in a 
quote from an experienced former DG RELEX official, posted at one of the important EU Delegations:  
We have, of course, the formal guidelines from the FAC and there is the functional hierarchy 
as defined by Lady Ashton and her people. So there is no independence, the guidelines are 
there, but we have our “marge de manoeuvre” within which we can act here at the 
Delegation, depending on what we think is right. HQ is formulating guidelines, like in the case 
of any Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but there is also European Parliament with the Foreign 
Affairs Committee and the European Council – all of these are our political masters (‘Herren 
und Meister’, interview #32, own translation9). 
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Table 6: Which are the political signals emphasized in officials’ decision-making? 
 HEADQUARTER (mean N=78) DELEGATIONS (mean N=73) 
 
(Very) 
important 
(%) 
Somewhat 
important 
(%) 
Less/not 
important 
(%) 
(Very) 
important 
(%) 
Somewhat 
important 
(%) 
Less/not 
important 
(%) 
European Council 75.6 21.6 2.8 80.0 10.9 9.1 
Foreign Affairs 
Council 
82.2 13.7 4.1 74.1 14.8 11.1 
European 
Commission 
74.7 20.0 5.3 89.8 1.7 8.5 
European 
Parliament 
60.3 27.4 12.4 71.9 15.8 12.3 
‘Big’ MS 64.9 20.3 14.9 48.3 21.4 30.3 
‘Medium-sized’ MS 41.1 38.4 20.5 25.0 42.9 32.1 
‘Small’ MS 30.2 42.5 27.4 17.6 38.6 33.9 
Domestic 
Government 
22.7 12.0 65.3 14.3 21.4 64.3 
Political level/ 
senior management 
92.3 6.5 1.3 91.4 3.4 5.1 
Direct hierarchy 93.7 6.3 0.0 93.3 5.0 1.7 
International 
Organizations 
24.6 38.4 37.0 27.3 45.5 27.3 
Other 21.1 31.6 47.4 22.2 22.2 55.6 
Political signals emphasized by officials (Total N=151) 
Original codes as used in the survey: 1 = “Very important”, 2 = “Important”, 3 = “Somewhat important”, 4 = “Less 
important”, 5 = “Not important at all”, 0 = “Can’t say”. 
 
Other than a clear emphasis put on signals from EU-level institutions, an interesting observation 
concerns the relative overall importance that is given to the EP, which echoes that the MEPs by smartly 
playing their hand throughout the negotiations, which ultimately led to the EEAS Decision of 26 July 
2010, have gained influence and political weight vis-à-vis other EU institutions – at least in the eyes of 
EEAS officials. Commission officials, for instance, also share this observation in a quote, summarizing 
a trend, ‘[F]or many years the EP was unimportant and it was ignored. It had the least standing among 
the institutions of the EU. It is undergoing a process of transition – gaining power and knowing how 
to use it’ (Ellinas and Suleiman 2012: 80). 
Although not a principal in the sense of delegated authority, the EP, too, has some degree of political 
ownership and it exercises control and oversight functions as regards the EU’s external policies, last 
but not least for the EEAS’ administrative budget. After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
EP enjoys larger influence on foreign policy than most of its national counterparts in the MS. And it 
could further strengthen its role and status during the EEAS negotiations, also written down in the 
preamble of the EEAS Decision, guaranteeing the EP ‘to fully play a role in the external action of the 
Union, including its functions of political control’ (Council 2010). Parliamentary hearings of senior EEAS 
officials (including EU Heads of Delegations prior to their appointment) have become a common 
practice and ‘the HR/VP ensures the views of the EP are taken into consideration’. This is particularly 
the case for the views, motions or reports issued by the EP’s Foreign Affairs committee (AFET). Ulrike 
Lunacek, (MEP for the Greens) expresses very clearly a growing desire for parliamentary control and 
oversight,  
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We wish that the Parliament would exercise even more control and be more active, for 
instance that we put reservations on [EEAS] funds. We could for instance release the budget 
lines for salaries only under the condition, that there will be structural changes in the EEAS. 
The EP can do that. The question is if the large fractions are ready to let their words be 
followed by actions. We should think about this in the context of the review (Interview #36, 
own translation10). 
But also in the EP’s recommendations to the HR/VP (EP, AFET 2013) the desire for co-ownership of 
the EEAS and particularly the EU DELs is very well documented, in eight specific recommendations 
(Recommendations 17-25) on EU Delegations and five recommendations regarding the 
implementation of the ‘Declaration on Political Accountability’ which was annexed to the EEAS 
Decision (Recommendations 31-36),  
32. To ensure full political reporting from Union delegations to key office holders of 
Parliament under regulated access; 33. To ensure, in line with Article 218 (1) TEU that 
Parliament is immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedures for negotiations 
on international agreements, including agreements concluded in the area of CFSP; 34. In line 
with the positive experiences of newly appointed Heads of Delegations and EUSRs appearing 
before AFET before taking up their posts, to extend this practice to newly appointed CSDP 
Heads of Missions and Operations; 35. To ensure that, once appointed by the HR/VP, the new 
Heads of Delegations are officially confirmed by the relevant committee of Parliament, before 
taking up their posts. 
The EU MS, the Commission and the EP all have stakes in the European External Action Service and 
the EU DELs to third countries. Therefore, I suggest the notion of “double-agent” as a way of 
characterizing the situation of the EEAS and in particular the Union Delegations, vis-à-vis their dual 
sets of principals, namely on the one side the intergovernmental masters (the MS via the Council and 
individually), and supranational stakeholders (the Commission when acting as a principal, and the EP 
as the directly elected body, exercising democratic oversight). Double – or, in fact, multiple - agency, 
characterizes the complex chains of authority and accountability, through which the EU external 
agents have to interact with and to answer to different forums of principals, functioning within their 
own competence spheres and according to distinct decision-making rules. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article has attempted to unveil and extract the interwoven, sometimes woolly lines of delegation 
leading from the principals, MS, Commission, and also the EP all the way down to the field-level 
bureaucrats, the EU diplomats posted at EU Delegations. As demonstrated, the results of the empirical 
research indicate interesting differences between headquarters officials and DEL staff. Contact 
patterns are varying significantly between HQ and DELs, with the former showing higher frequencies 
of intra-organizational and the latter significantly more outside-contacts. Internally, upstream 
communication and information flows are thinning out, leading to considerable informational 
asymmetries to the agent’s advantage. Political signals are emitted from different sources and 
received and taken into consideration by EU diplomats to different extents depending on their posting 
and affiliation as well as their relation with the political masters. EU-Diplomats in third countries tend 
to more strongly emphasize signals from the supra-national EU institutions, the Commission as well 
as the EP, whereas signals from MS as well as the intergovernmental bodies are considerably less 
strongly taken into account. These, in turn, are clearly more present at HQ. Altogether, for the EU’s 
external agents, the institutional change has produced certain ambiguities, necessitating flexibility, 
adaptability and improvisation in order to make sense of their situation and the sometimes-
contradictive demands they are confronted with. 
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Control is exercised in different ways and at several places, directly or indirectly. MS retain important 
decision-making powers in the FAC as well as the PSC, and have their own agents seconded to the 
service, exercising oversight in a way of quasi-monitoring the service from within via their diplomats 
in key positions inside the organization. The MS are trying to stay on top of the game, which they are 
the “grand masters” of, since they have been at the origin of delegation to the supranational bodies 
of the EU in the first place. However, they are not consolidated as a unified, collective principal, and 
visibly display heterogeneity of preferences, more or less directly and openly conflicting with one 
another. The Commission, on the other side, remains in charge over important policy competences, 
budgets and large portions of staff at the EU DELs. It has the advantage of the incumbent supranational 
bureaucracy, already in place and in possession of many of those competences, expertise and 
resources, which the EEAS critically needs. Finally, the Parliament, having co-ownership in ex-ante 
control, through its co-decision powers with regard to the administrative budget and the staff 
regulations, as well as the formal approval of the nomination of EU Heads of Delegations, the work of 
the AFET committee, parliamentary reports, motions on particular policy issues or geographical areas 
and through field visits of parliamentary delegations. We have seen that, in the case of the EEAS, 
chains of delegation are interwoven and partly overlapping (redundant), involving actors and forums 
at different levels of governance, within separate jurisdictions, based on their respective 
constitutional arrangements and modes of decision-making. Control of the EEAS is transversal and 
crosses national borders, institutional and organizational boundaries as well as sectorial competences. 
Roles of actors and forums are blurred, allowing for some actors to be forums of other actors at the 
same time. They behave as principals in certain competence areas or at certain stages of the processes 
- which is why this analysis tentatively speaks of “nested delegation.” In practice, system 
fragmentation, incomplete contracts, asymmetrical information and diverging (or even opposing) 
preferences among the principals, together with lack of clarity or conflicting signals and instructions 
may complicate the work of EEAS officials, but at the same time create the opportunity for agency as 
well as political drift. Information advantages to the benefit of the EEAS, dividing lines between EU 
institutions and member states as well as the evolution of a distinct EU diplomatic esprit de corps or 
EEAS organizational culture may further add to the potential for developing agency autonomy. 
*** 
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